The BG-simulation is a powerful reduction algorithm designed for asynchronous read/write crashprone systems, namely, it allows a set of (t + 1) asynchronous sequential processes to wait-free simulate (i.e., despite the crash of up to t of them) an arbitrary number n of processes under the assumption that at most t of them crash. The BG simulation shows that, in read/write systems, the crucial parameter is not the number n of processes, but the upper bound t on the number of process crashes.
Introduction 4 BG(MP,C): BG in the Crash-prone Asynchronous Message-Passing Model
This section presents the algorithm BG(MP,C). As previously indicated, this algorithm simulates, in the model CAMP n,t [t < n/2], an algorithm A ′ solving a task in CAMP n ′ ,t [t < n ′ ]. It is made up of two parts: an algorithm implementing a safe agreement object, and the simulation itself, which uses several of these objects to allow the simulators to cooperate.
Safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2]: definition
This object type (or variants of it), briefly sketched in the Introduction, is at the core of both the BG simulation [6, 7, 14, 21] , and the liveness guarantees of concurrent objects [22, 23] . It is a one-shot object that solves consensus in failure-free scenarios, and allows processes to agree with a weak termination guarantee in the presence of failures.
A safe agreement object provides each simulator q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with two operations denoted propose() and decide(), that q i can invoke at most once, and in this order; propose() allows q i to propose a value, while decide() allows it to decide a value. Considering the crash failure model, the properties associated with this object are the following ones.
• Validity. A decided value is a proposed value.
• Agreement. No two simulators decide distinct values.
• Propose-Termination. An invocation of propose() by a correct simulator terminates.
• Decide-Termination. If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), then any invocation of decide() by a correct simulator terminates.
It is easy to see that a safe agreement object is a consensus object whose termination condition is failuredependent. Algorithms implementing safe agreement objects (or variants of it) can be found in [6, 7, 23] .
Safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2]: algorithm
An algorithm implementing a safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2] is described in Figure 1 .
Local data structures Each simulator q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, manages three local data structures, namely, the arrays values i [1.
.n], my_view i [1.
.n], all_views i [1.
.n], all initialized to [⊥, ..., ⊥], where ⊥ denotes a default value that cannot be proposed to the safe agreement object by the simulators.
• The aim of values i [x] is to contain, as currently known by q i , the value proposed to the safe agreement object by the simulator q x . • The aim of my_view i [x] is to contain, as known by q i , the value proposed to the safe agreement object by the simulator q x , as witnessed by strictly more than n 2 distinct simulators (i.e., at least a correct process).
• The aim of all_views i [x] is to contain what to q i 's knows about the view seen by q x .
Algorithm: the operation propose() The algorithm implementing the operation propose() invoked by a simulator q i is described at lines C01-C14 (client side) and lines C20-C22 (server side). This algorithm is made up of three parts.
First part. A simulator q i first broadcasts the message VALUE (i, v i ), where v i is the value it proposes to the safe agreement object (line C01). Then, it waits until it knows that strictly more than n 2 simulators know its value (line C02). On its "server" side, when q i receives for the first time the message VALUE (x, v), it first saves v in values i [x] ; then it forwards the received message to cope with the (possible) crash of q x (this witnesses the fact that q i knows the value proposed by p x , line C20) 1 ).
Second part. In this part, q i builds a local view of the values proposed by the n simulators. To this end, it first broadcasts messages READ (i, x), 1 ≤ x ≤ n, to learn the value proposed by each simulator q x (line C03). On its server side, when q i receives such a message, it broadcasts by return its current knowledge of the value proposed by q x (line C21).
Then, the simulator q i builds its local view of the values that have been proposed. For each simulator q x , q i waits until it has received from strictly more than n 2 distinct simulators the very same message, namely, either the message READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥), or the message VALUE (x, w) (lines C05-C06). In the first case, q i considers that q x has not yet proposed a value, while in the second case it considers that q x proposed the 1 Let us observe that the lines C01 and C20 implement a reliable broadcast of the message VALUE (i, vi). Similarly, the lines C12 and C22 implement a reliable broadcast of the message VIEW (i, my_viewi). It is easy to see that the cost of such a reliable broadcast is O(n 2 ) messages.
operation propose (vi) is (C01) broadcast VALUE (i, vi); (C02) wait VALUE (i, vi) received from strictly more than n 2 different simulators ; (C03) for each x ∈ [1..n] do broadcast READ (i, x) end for; (C04) for each x ∈ [1..n] do (C05) wait READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) received from strictly more than 
%--------------------------------------when the message VALUE (x, v) is received for the first time:
% "for the first time" is with respect to each pair of values (x, v) % (C20) valuesi[x] ← v; broadcast VALUE (x, v). value w (let us observe that, while q i can receive both READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) and messages VALUE (x, w), it stops waiting as soon as it received strictly more than n 2 of one of them) (lines C07-C10). Third part. Finally, the simulator q i informs the other simulators on its local view my_view i [1..n]. To this end, it broadcasts the message VIEW (i, my_view i ). When it has received the corresponding "acknowledgments", q i returns from its invocation of the operation propose() (line C12-C14). (The behavior of q i when it receives a message VIEW (x, view) is similar to the one when it receives a message VALUE (x, v). The only difference is that values i [x] is now replaced by all_views i [x], line C22.) Algorithm: the operation decide() The algorithm implementing the operation decide() is described at lines C15-C19. It consists in a "closure" computation. A simulator q i waits until it knows a non-empty set of simulators σ such that (a) it knows their views, and (b) this set is closed under the relation "has in its published view the value of" which means that the processes whose values appear in a view of a process of σ are also in σ (lines C15-C16).
Let us observe that it is possible that, locally, several sets satisfy this property. If it is the case, q i selects the smallest of them. Let min_σ i be this set of simulators (lines C17). The value that is returned by q i is then the smallest value among the the values proposed by the simulators in min_σ i (lines C18-C19).
Safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2]: proof
This section proves that the algorithm presented in Figure 1 implements a safe agreement object, i.e., any of its runs in CAMP n,t [t < n/2] satisfies the validity, agreement, and termination properties, which define it.
Lemma 1. An invocation of propose() by a simulator that does not crash during this invocation, terminates.
Proof Let us consider a simulator q i that does not crash during its invocation of propose(). Hence, q i broadcast the message VALUE (i, v i ) at line C01. This message is received by strictly more than n 2 correct simulators, and each of them broadcasts this message when it receives it. It follows that q i cannot block forever at line C02.
Let us now consider the wait statement at lines C05-C06. There are two cases. Let READ (i, x) be a message broadcast by the simulator q i at line C03.
• Case 1: No correct simulator ever receives a message VALUE (x, −). In this case, each correct simulator q y is such that values y [x] remains always equal to ⊥. It follows that, when q y receives the message READ (i, x), it sends back to q i the message READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) (line C21). As there are strictly more than n 2 correct simulators, q i eventually receives the message READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) from strictly more than n 2 different simulators, and the predicate of line C05 is then satisfied.
• Case 2: At least one correct simulator q y receives a message VALUE (x, v). In this case, q y broadcasts the message VALUE (x, v) when it receives it (line C20). It follows from the broadcasts issued at this line that q i eventually receives VALUE (x, v) from strictly more than n 2 different simulators. When this occurs, the predicate of line C06 is satisfied, and q i exits the wait statement.
As this is true for any message READ (i, x) broadcast by the simulator q i at line C03, it follows that q i cannot remain block forever at lines C05-C06.
Let us finally consider the lines C12-C13. As the message VIEW (i, my_view i ) broadcast by q i at line C12 is received by at least all the correct processes, and each of them broadcast it when it receives it for the first time, it follows that q i receives the message VIEW (i, my_view i ) from strictly more than n 2 distinct processes, and stops waiting at line C13, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
✷ Lemma 1
Lemma 2. The value returned by an invocation of propose() is a value that was proposed by a simulator.
Proof Let us observe that (due to its definition) the set min_σ is non-empty, and (due the first predicate of line C06) the simulator indexes y it contains are such that values i [y] = ⊥. As, for any of those y, values i [y] is set to a non-⊥ value (only once) at line C20, it follows that q i received a message VALUE (y, v y ). Hence, the values in the variables values i [y] are values proposed by the corresponding simulators q y . It follows that the value computed at line C18 is a value that was proposed by a simulator, which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷ Lemma 2
Lemma 3. No two invocations of decide() return different values.
Proof Let us first observe that, due to the reliable broadcast of the messages VALUE () (lines C01 and C20) and VIEW () (lines C12 and C22), and the fact that a simulator broadcast a single message VALUE (), we have:
•
Let us assume, by contradiction, that two simulators q i and q j decide different values. This means that the sets min_σ i min_σ j computed at line C17 by q i and q j , respectively, are different.
Since min_σ i and min_σ j are different, let us consider z ∈ min_σ i \ min_σ j (if min_σ i min_σ j , swap i and j). According to the closure predicate used at line C16, as z / ∈ min_σ j , we have ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views j [y][z] = ⊥. It follows that any simulator q y such that y ∈ min_σ j does not fulfill the condition of line C07 for x = z. Consequently, q y received at line C05 a message READ'ANSWER(y, z, ⊥) from a set of simulators Q y,r(z) of size strictly greater than n 2 . Consequently when q y executed line C03 for
When the simulator q z stops waiting at line C02, it received messages VALUE(z,v z ) (where v z is the value sent by q z at line C01) from a set Q z,w of strictly more than n 2 simulators. It follows that Q y,r(z) ∩ Q z,w = ∅, consequently there is a simulator q k that sent a message READ'ANSWER(y, z, ⊥) to q y and a message VALUE(z,v z ) to q z . Since value k [z] is never reset to ⊥ after being assigned, the simulator q y necessarily executed line C03 for x = z strictly before q z stops waiting at line C02. Consequently q y stopped waiting at line C02 before q z executes line C03 for x = y. It does so after receiving messages VALUE(y,v y ) (where v y is the value sent by q y at line C01) from a set Q y,w of strictly more than n 2 simulators q k , and each of these simulators then verifies values k = v y . These simulators do not send READ'ANSWER(z, y, ⊥) messages when they receive the READ(z, y) message sent by q z . Thus, it is impossible that q z receives these messages from strictly more than n 2 processes, it consequently cannot verify the predicate of line C05. It follows that q z executes line C12 with my_view z [y] = v y = ⊥ and this entails that ∀k ∈ Π :
According to the predicate of line C16, this entails that y ∈ min_σ i , and since the previous reasoning holds for any y ∈ min_σ j , it shows that min_σ j ⊆ min_σ i . It follows that, when q i executes line C17, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = ⊥ and, consequently, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = all_views j [y]. It entails that if |min_σ j | < |min_σ i |, then min_σ j would have been chosen by q i at line C17, which proves that min_σ i = min_σ j and contradicts the fact that q i and q j decide differently.
✷ Lemma 3
Lemma 4. If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), then any invocation of decide() by a correct simulator terminates.
Proof If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), it follows from Lemma 1 that every simulator q i that invokes propose() broadcasts a message VALUE (i, v i ) at line C01 and a message VIEW (i, my_views i ) at line C12. Assuming no simulator crashes while executing propose(), let P be the set of simulators that invoke propose(), and suppose that one of them, q i , invoke decide() and never terminates. This can only happen if q i waits forever for the condition of lines C15-C16 to be fulfilled. Since eventually the messages broadcast by the simulators of P are all delivered to q i , after some finite time ∀y ∈ P : all_views i [y] = ⊥. Moreover, since the views broadcast by the simulators of P are built at line C08 from the messages VALUE (−,−) they receive, it follows that these views can contain non-⊥ values only for the entries corresponding to the simulators of P (the simulators that are not in P do not sent messages VALUE(−,−)). Consequently, p i eventually verifies ∀y ∈ P : (all_views
It follows that the property of lines C15-C16 is eventually true for σ = P , which contradicts the fact that q i never terminates its decide() operation.
✷ Lemma 4 Theorem 1. The algorithm in Figure 1 implements a safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2].
Proof
The proof follows from Lemma 1 (Propose-Termination), Lemma 2 (Validity), Lemma 3 (Agreement), and Lemma 4 (Decide-Termination). ✷ Theorem 1
Simulation algorithm
The simulation algorithm takes as input a distributed algorithm A ′ solving a (colorless) task in the system model CAMP n ′ ,t [t < n ′ ], and simulates it in CAMP n,t [t < n/2]. Each simulator q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is given a copy of the n ′ processes of A ′ , and a private input vector input i [1..n ′ ], with one input per simulated processes p j .
The simulation consists in a fair simulation by each of the n simulators q i of the n ′ simulated processes p j . To that end, each simulator manages n ′ threads (each simulating a process p j ), and the n threads associated with the simulation of a process p j cooperate through safe agreement objects.
Objects shared by the simulators To produce a consistent simulation, for each simulated process p j , the n simulators have to agree on the same sequence of the messages received by p j . To that end, they use an array of safe agreement objects, denoted SA[1..n ′ , −], such that SA[j, sn] allows them to agree on the sn-th message received by the n ′ threads simulating p j at each simulator q i .
Objects managed by each simulator q i Each simulator manages the following data structures, with respect to each simulated process p j .
• input i [j] contains the input of the simulated process p j , proposed by the simulator q i . (Simulators are allowed to propose different input vectors for the simulated processes).
is the sequence number (from the simulation point of view) of the next message received by the simulated process p j .
is a sequence containing messages sent by the simulated processes to the simulated process p j . It is assumed that the n ′ threads of q i access sent i [j] in mutual exclusion (when they add messages to or withdraw messages from this sequence). The symbol ⊕ is used to add messages at the end of a sequence. Sometimes sent i [j] is used as a set.
is a set containing the messages received by the simulated process p j (init. ∅).
• state i [j] contains the current local state of the simulated process p j .
It is assumed that the behavior of each simulated process p j is described by a deterministic transition function δ j (), such that δ j (state i [j], msg) (a) simulates p j until its next message reception, and (b) returns a pair. This pair is made up of the new local state of p j plus an array msgs[1..n ′ ] where msgs[x] contains messages sent by p j to the simulated process p x .
In addition to the previous local data, each simulator q i uses a starvation-free mutual exclusion lock, whose operations are denoted mutex_in i () and mutex_out i (). This lock is used to ensure that, at any time, at most one of the n ′ threads of q i access a safe agreement object. This is to guarantee that the crash of a simulator q i entails the crash of at most one simulated process p j (line 09). More precisely, if q i crashes while executing SA[j, sn].propose.(), it can block forever only the invocations of SA[j, sn].decide.(), issued by the other simulators, thereby preventing the simulation of p j from terminating.
The simulation algorithm The algorithm describing the simulation of a process p j by the associated thread of the simulator q i is presented in Figure 2 .
The simulators have first to agree on the same input for process p j . To this end, they use the safe agreement object SA[j, 0] (lines 01-02). Moreover, when considering all the simulated processes, it follows from the mutual exclusion lock that, whatever the number of simulated processes, a simulator q i is engaged in at most one invocation of propose() at a time. Then, according to the decided input of p j , q i locally simulate p j until it invokes a message reception (lines 03-04).
After this initialization, each simulator q i enters a loop whose aim is to locally simulate p j . To this end, q i first determines the message that p j will receive; this message is saved in rec_msg and added to received i [j] (lines 07-12). When this message has been determined, q i simulates the behavior of p j until its next message reception (lines [13] [14] . Finally, if state i [j] allows p j to decide a value with respect to the simulated decision task, this value is decided (lines 15-17). 
Proof of the simulation
The reader interested in a formal definition of the term simulation -as used here-will consult [7] .
Lemma 5. The crash of a simulator q i entails the crash of at most one simulated process p j .

Proof
The only places where a simulator q i can block is during the invocation of the safe agreement operation decide(). Such invocations appear at line 02, and line 11. It follows from the termination property of the safe agreement objects that such an invocation can block forever the invoking process only if a simulator crashes during the invocation of the operation propose() on the same object. But, due to the mutual exclusion lock used at line 01 and line 10, a simulator can be engaged in at most one invocation of propose at a time. It follows that the crash of a simulation q i can entail the definitive halting (crash) of at most one simulated process p j .
✷ Lemma 5
Lemma 6. The simulation of the reception of the k-th message received by a simulated process p j , returns the same message at all simulators.
Proof The simulation of the message receptions for a simulated process p j , are executed at each simulator q i at lines 08-11, and all the simulators use the same sequence of sequence numbers (line 07). It then follows from the agreement property of the safe agreement object SA[j, sn], that no two simulators obtain different messages when they invoke SA[j, sn].decide(), and the lemma follows. ✷ Lemma 6
Lemma 7. For every simulated processes p j , no two simulators return different values.
Proof The only non-deterministic elements of the simulation are the input vectors input i [1..n ′ ] at each simulator q i , and the reception of the simulated messages.
The lines 01-02 of the simulation force the simulators to agree on the same input value for each simulated process p j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n ′ . Similarly, as shown by Lemma 6, for each simulated process p j , the lines 07-11 direct the simulators to agree on the very same sequence of messages received by p j . It follows from the fact that the function δ j () is deterministic, that any two simulators q i and q k , that execute lines 15-16 during the same "round number" Proof To prove the correctness of the simulation, we have to show that 1. Every message that was sent by a simulated process to another simulated process (whose simulation is not blocked either), is received, and 2. The simulated messages respect a simulated physical order (i.e., no message is "received" before being "sent").
Item 1 is satisfied because the messages sent by the simulated process p j to the simulated process p k are received (lines 09-11) in their sending order (as defined at line 04 and line 14). Hence, if p k is not blocked (due to the crash of a simulator) it obtains the messages from p j in their sending order.
For Item 2, let us define a (simulated) physical order as follows. For each simulated message m, let us consider the first time at which the reception of m was simulated (i.e., this occurs when -for the first time-a simulator terminates the invocation of SA[−, −].decide() that returns m). A message that is decided has been proposed by a simulator to a safe agreement object before being decided (validity property).The sending time of a simulated message is defined as the first time at which SA[−, −].propose(m) is invoked by a simulator. It follows that any simulated message is sent before being received, which concludes the lemma. ✷ Lemma 8 Lemma 9. Each correct simulator q i computes the decision value of at least (n ′ − t) simulated processes.
Proof Due to Lemma 5, and the fact that at most t simulators may crash, it follows that at most t simulated processes may be prevented from progressing. As (a) by assumption the simulated algorithm A ′ is t-resilient, and (b) due to Lemma 8 the simulation produces a correct simulation of A ′ , it follows that at least (n ′ − t) simulated processes decide a value.
Proof The theorem follows from Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. ✷ Theorem 2
BG(MP,B): BG in the Byzantine Asynchronous Message-Passing Model
This section presents an algorithm, denoted BG(MP,B), which implements the BG simulation in the Byzantine asynchronous message-passing model BAMP n,t [t < n/3]. To this end, an appropriate safe agreement object is first built, and then used by the simulation algorithm.
From crash failures to Byzantine behaviors
The idea is to extend the algorithm of Figure 1 to obtain an algorithm that copes with Byzantine simulators. The main issues that have to be solved are the following.
• The simulators need a mechanism to control the validity of the inputs to the safe agreement objects.
(See below for the notion of a valid value.) • The simulators must be able to check if a simulator q i is participating in more than one operation propose() at the same time (on the same or several safe agreement objects). If it is the case, q i is faulty and its definitive stop can block forever several simulated processes. Hence, such a faulty simulator has to be ignored.
To solve these issues, each safe agreement object may no longer be considered as a separate abstraction: each instance depends on the previous ones. This is captured in the following specification customized to the Byzantine model, and, at the operational level, in the predicate valid() used in the algorithm implementing the operation propose().
Safe agreement in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]: definition
To cope with the previous observations, the fact that a faulty process may decide an arbitrary value, and the fact that the safe agreement objects are used to solve specific problems (a simulation in our case), the specification of the safe agreement object is reshaped as follows.
A value proposed by a process to a safe agreement object must be valid. At each correct simulator q i , the validity of a value is captured by a predicate denoted valid i (j, v) where v is the value and q j the simulator that proposed it. This predicate is made up of two parts (defined in Section 5.3 and Section 5.6, respectively). If q j is correct, the predicate valid i (j, v) eventually returns true at p i . If q j is faulty, valid i (j, v) returns true at p i only if (a) the value v could have been proposed by a correct simulator and (b) to q i 's knowledge, q j does not participate concurrently in several invocations of propose().
• Validity. If a correct simulator q i decides the value v, there is a correct simulator q j such that valid j (−, v).
(v was validated by a correct simulator.) • Agreement. No two correct simulators decide distinct values.
• Propose-Termination. Any invocation of propose() by a correct simulator terminates.
• Decide-Termination. The invocations by all the correct simulators of decide() on all the safe agreement objects terminate, except for at most t safe agreement objects.
Safe agreement in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]: algorithm
The local variables
.n], and the algorithm implementing the operation decide() are the same as in Figure 1 (lines C15-C19). The new algorithm implementing the operation propose(), and the processing of the associated messages, are described in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . This implementation uses an additional local array
.n], all entries of which are initialized to "?". The meaning of "
(where v is a proposed value or ⊥) is the following: to the knowledge of q i , the simulator q k answered value v when it received the message READ(j, x) sent by q j . (A simulator q j broadcasts such a message when it needs to know the value proposed by the simulator q x ; ⊥ means that q k does not know this value yet.) This means that, from q i 's point of view, the value proposed by q x , as known by q k when it received the request by q j , is v. Proof As we consider integers, "strictly more than n+t 2 " is equivalent to "at least ⌊
✷ Lemma 10 The fact that, despite Byzantine processes, the intersection of any two simulator sets of size greater than n+t 2 have at least one correct simulator in common, is used in many places in the algorithm. This property will be used in the proof to show that the local views of the correct processes are mutually consistent.
The operation propose() The client side of the algorithm implementing the operation propose() is described in Figure 3 ; its server side is described in Figure 4 . The client side algorithm is very close to the one of the crash failure case (Figure 1 ). They differ in two points.
• The message tags VALUE and VIEW (used at lines C02, C06, and C13 in Figure 1 ) are replaced in Figure 3 by the tags VALUE'ACK and VIEW'ACK, respectively. The role of these message tags is explained below.
• The predicate of line B05 is replaced by the predicate |{k :
. This predicate states that more than n+t 2 simulators answered ⊥ to the request message READ(i, x) broadcast by q i , (i.e., they did not know the value proposed by q x when they received the read request). On its server side, when a simulator q i receives a message VALUE (j, v), it first checks if this message is valid (line B15). If the message is valid, q i broadcasts (echoes) the message VALUE'VALID (j, v) to inform the other simulators that it agrees to take into account the pair (j, v) (line B15).
When the simulator p i has received the message VALUE'VALID (j, v) from more than n+t 2 simulators, it broadcasts the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) to inform the other processes that at least
When q i has received the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) from (t + 1) simulators (i.e., from at least one correct simulator) it broadcasts this message, if not yet done (lines B18-B20). This is to prevent invocations of propose() from blocking forever (while waiting VALUE'ACK (j, v) messages at line B02, B06, B24 or B38), because not enough VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) messages have been broadcast 2 . Then, if q i has received the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) from more than n+t 2 simulators, it takes v into account (writes it into values i [j]) and sends an acknowledgment to q j (lines B21-B23). The corresponding message VALUE'ACK (j, v) broadcast by q i will also inform the other simulators that q i took into account the value v proposed by q j . Hence, this message will help q j progress at line B02, and all correct simulators progress at line B06.
when the message VALUE (j, v) is received from qj for the first time:
when the message VALUE'VALID (j, v) is received:
when the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) is received:
when the message READ (j, x) is received from qj for the first time:
when the message READ'ANSWER (j, x, v) is received from q k for the first time:
when the message VIEW (j, view) is received from qj for the first time:
when the message VIEW'WITNESS (j, view) is received: First part of the predicate valid i (j, v) As already indicated, the aim of this predicate is to help a simulator q i detect if the value v proposed by the simulator q j is valid. It is always satisfied when q j is correct, and it can return true or false when q j is faulty. It is made up of two sub-predicates P 1 and P 2.
• The first sub-predicate P 1 checks if, for the messages VALUE (j, −) (from q j ) and VALUE'VALID (j, −) (from more than t + 1 different simulators) that q i has received for other safe agreement objects, q i has also received the associated messages VIEW'WITNESS (j, −) from at least (n − t) different simulators. This allows q i to check if the simulator q j is not simultaneously participating in other invocations of propose() on other safe agreement objects.
• The aim of the second sub-predicate P 2 (defined Section 5.6 and used in the simulation) is to allow the simulators to check that the simulation is consistent. As the present section considers safe agreement objects independently from the simulation, we consider, for now, that P 2 is always satisfied.
If the full predicate valid i (j, v) is never satisfied, q i will, collectively with the other correct simulators, prevent the faulty simulator q j from progressing with respect to the corresponding safe agreement object.
Messages READ(), READ'ANSWER() and READ'ANSWER'WITNESS() After the value v i it proposes to the safe agreement object has been taken into account by When q i receives the message READ (j, x) from the simulator q j , it first waits until it knows that the value proposed by q j is known by more than n+t 2 simulators (line B24). This is to check that q j broadcast its proposed value before reading the other simulator values used to build its own view. When this occurs, q i answers the message READ (j, x) by broadcasting the message READ'ANSWSER (j, x, values i [x]) to inform all the simulators on what it currently knows on the value proposed by q x (line B26). (Let us remind that, in the crash failure model, q i was sending this message only to q j .)
When it receives the message READ'ANSWER (j, x, v) from a simulator q k , if not yet done, q i broadcasts the message READ'ANSWSER'WITNESS (k, j, x, v). The lines B27-B31 implement a reliable broadcast [8] , i.e., the message READ'ANSWSER'WITNESS (k, j, x, v) is received by all correct processes or none of them, and is always received if the sender is correct. The reliable reception of this message entails the assignment of answer i [k, j, x] to v (line B33).
Messages VIEW(), VIEW'WITNESS() and VIEW'ACK() Finally, as in Figure 1 , the simulator q i broadcasts its local view of proposed values to all simulators, waits until more than n+t 2 of them sent back an acknowledgment, and returns from the invocation of propose() (lines B12-B14).
When q i receives for the first time the message VIEW (j, view), it realizes an enriched reliable broadcast whose aim is to assign view to all_view i Finally, when q i receives a message VIEW'WITNESS (j, view), it does the following. First, if it has received this message from at least one correct simulator, and has not yet broadcast it, q i does it (lines B44-B46). This part of the reliable broadcast is to prevent the correct simulators from blocking forever. Then, if it has received VIEW'WITNESS (j, view) from more than n+t 2 simulators and has not yet assigned a value to all_view i [j], q i does it and sends to q j the acknowledgment message VIEW'ACK (j, view) to inform q j that it knows its view (lines B47-B49).
A communication pattern
When considering the algorithm of Figure 4 , it appears that the processing of the messages VALUE'WITNESS () (lines B18-B23), READ'ANSWER'WITNESS () (lines B28-B34), and VIEW'WITNESS () (lines B44-B49), follow the same generic pattern. This pattern, inspired from [8] and where WITNESS is used as message tag, is described in Figure 5 .
then execute statement A (GP07) end if. Proof Proof of (i). Let p i be a correct process that executes A. It follows from line GP05 that it has received the message WITNESS (m) from more than n+t 2 different simulators. As n > 3t, ⌊ n+t 2 ⌋ + 1 ≥ 2t + 1, p i received the message WITNESS (m) from at least (t + 1) correct simulators. It then follows from lines GP01-GP02 that all correct simulators broadcast WITNESS (m) and, consequently, each correct simulator receives WITNESS (m) from at least (n − t) simulators. The proof follows from n − t > n+t 2 . Proof of (ii). If (t+1) correct simulators broadcast WITNESS (m), the predicate of line GP01 is eventually satisfied at every correct simulator. As As n − t > n+t 2 , it follows that the predicate of line GP05 will also be satisfied at each correct simulator, which concludes the proof.
✷ Theorem 3
Safe agreement object in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]: proof
This section proves that the algorithm presented in Figures 3 and 4 implements a safe agreement object in the presence of Byzantine simulators, i.e., any of its runs in BAMP n,t [t < n/3] satisfies the validity, agreement, and termination properties that define this object. Proof A correct simulator q i can be blocked forever in a wait statement (1) at line B02, (2) at lines B05-B06, or (3) at line B13. We show that, if the predicate valid j (i, v i ) is eventually satisfied at the correct simulators q j , p i cannot block forever in the invocation of propose(v i ).
Propose-termination
• wait instruction at line B02. Simulator q i first broadcasts the message VALUE(i, v i ) (line B01), then waits for VALUE'ACK messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators. When a correct simulator q j receives VALUE(i, v i ) for the first time, it waits until valid j (i, v i ) becomes satisfied. By assumption, this happens. Simulator q j then broadcasts VALUE'VALID(i, v i ). It follows that each of the at least (n − t) correct simulators broadcasts the message VALUE'VALID(i, v i ).
As n − t > n+t 2 , it follows that each correct simulator q j receives the message VALUE'VALID(i, v i ) from more than n+t 2 simulators and broadcasts the message VALUE'WITNESS(i, v i ). According to Theorem 3, q j updates values j [i] with v i , and broadcasts VALUE'ACK(i, v i ) (lines B21-B23). The correct simulator q i will then receive the message VALUE'ACK(i, v i ) from at least n − t > n+t 2 simulators. Hence, it cannot block forever at line B02.
• wait instruction at lines B05-B06.
In this waiting statement, q i waits until either |{k :
becomes true, or until it receives VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators.
-If q j is a correct simulator that invoked propose(j, w), the reasoning is the same as above. Consequently, q i will receive VALUE'ACK(j, w) from at least n − t > n+t 2 different simulators. -If q j is faulty or never invokes propose(j, w), q i may never receive VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators. We will show that, in this case, the wait predicate |{k :
We first show that, if a correct simulator receives VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators, then all correct simulators do receive VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators. If a correct simulator receives VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators, at least (t + 1) correct simulators broadcast it. Every correct simulator will then receive the message VALUE'ACK(j, w) from at least (t + 1) different simulators and, if not already done, broadcasts it (lines B24-B25). All correct simulators will then receive the message VALUE'ACK(j, w) from at least n − t > n+t 2 different simulators.
According to the previous observation, let us consider the case in which no correct simulator ever receives the message VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than When a correct simulator receives a READ(i, j) message from q i , it waits until it has received VALUE'ACK(i, v i ) messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators (line B24). The reasoning above (first item) shows that this will eventually become true.
Every correct simulator q k will then broadcast READ'ANSWER(i, j, ⊥). This will cause all correct simulators to broadcast mess sages READ'ANSWER'WITNESS(k, i, j, ⊥), which will be received by the simulator q i . This will then assign ⊥ to
Consequently, it will not remain blocked at lines B05-B06.
• wait instruction at line B13.
As simulator q i broadcasts its view with a message VIEW(i, view) (line B12), every correct simulator checks if this view is consistent when it receives it (lines B36-B41). Let us first consider the entries view[j] such that view[j] = w = ⊥. This means that q i has received VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than All the correct simulators will then broadcast the message VIEW'WITNESS(i, view) (line B42). By Theorem 3, they will all send VIEW'ACK(i, view) to q i . This will allow q i to terminate its invocation of propose(i, v i ), which concludes the proof of the lemma.
✷ Proof We consider here that the sub-predicate P 2 is always satisfied, and thus consider only the sub-predicate P 1. Let us recall that P 1 states that, for every message VALUE(i, −) that q j received from q i , and for every message VALUE'VALID(i, −) that q j received from at least t + 1 different simulators, it has also received the corresponding messages VIEW'WITNESS(i, −). By hypothesis, valid j (i, v x ) is eventually satisfied at the correct simulator q j . Once q i broadcasts the message VALUE(i, v x ), q j only needs to receive the corresponding VIEW'WITNESS(i, view) for P 1 to be satisfied. By Lemma 11, q i terminates its invocation of propose(i, v x ), from which we conclude that it received VIEW'ACK(i, view) from more than Decide-termination
Lemma 13. If a correct simulator terminates its invocation of decide(), then all correct simulators terminate their invocation of decide().
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the invocation of decide() by a correct simulator q i terminates, and that the invocation of decide() by another correct simulator q j does not. The invocation of decide() by q i can terminate only if the predicate at lines C15-C16 is satisfied. Let q k be any simulator in the set σ defined at line C15. We show that all_views i [k] = view implies that we eventually have all_views j [k] = view, and thus that q j must decide.
Simulator q i assigns view to all_views i [k] at line B48. This can happen only because q i received VIEW'WITNESS(k, view) messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators. According to Theorem 3, q j eventually receives enough VIEW'WITNESS(k, view) messages and also assigns view to all_views j [k]. Simulator q j will then also have to decide. ✷ Lemma 13
Lemma 14. The invocations of decide() by all the correct simulators on all the safe agreement objects terminate, except for at most t safe agreement objects.
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are t + 1 safe agreement objects such that at least one correct simulator never terminates its invocation of decide(). By Lemma 13, there must be (t + 1) different safe agreement objects in which no correct simulator terminates its invocations of decide().
The invocation of the decide() operation by a correct simulator q i on a safe agreement object can only be blocked at lines C15-C16, if the corresponding predicate is never satisfied. This can happen if (1) there is no simulator q j such that all_views i [j] = ⊥ or, (2) for every non-empty set of simulators σ, there are two simulators q y ∈ σ and q z such that all_views i [y][z] = ⊥ ∧ all_views i [z] = ⊥. Because a correct simulator q i invokes propose() before invoking decide(), case (1) cannot happen; we always have all_views i [i] = ⊥. We then consider case (2) .
Case (2) can happen if q z starts an invocation of propose() and communicates its proposed value to other processes, but does not terminate its invocation by communicating its view. Because there are at most t faulty simulators, by the pigeonhole principle, there must be a faulty simulator q z that prevents q i from deciding on two different safe agreement objects.
A correct simulator q k broadcasts a VALUE'VALID(z, −) after receiving a VALUE(z, −) message only if the predicate valid k (z, −) is satisfied (line B15). Due to the predicate valid k (z, −), this is true only if q k received VIEW'WITNESS(z, −) messages from at least (n − t) different simulators, each of these messages corresponding to the all the VALUE(z, −) and VALUE'VALID(z, −) messages that it has previously received (see the definition of the predicate P 1 of valid k (z, −)).
Let propose(v 1 ) be the invocation of propose() by q z on the first safe agreement object on which q i is blocked, and propose(v 2 ) the one on the second safe agreement object on which q i is blocked. Because there is a simulator q y ∈ σ such that all_views i [y] = ⊥ in the two invocations of decide() by q i , in both cases, more than In order to broadcast a VALUE'WITNESS(z, −) message, a correct simulator must either (a) receive VALUE'WITNESS(z, −) messages from at least t+1 different simulators (line B18), or (b) receive VALUE'VALID(z, −) messages from more than According to Lemma 10, there is a least one correct simulator q ℓ that broadcasts both VALUE'VALID(z, −) messages (line B15). In order to do so, the predicate valid ℓ (z, v 2 ) must have been verified at the time that q ℓ broadcast the VALUE'VALID(z, v 2 ) message. It must then have received the VIEW'WITNESS(z, view) messages that correspond to v 1 from more than n+t 2 different simulators. According to Theorem 3, q i must then also have received these messages from more than Proof Let q k be the first simulator that assigns v to values k [x]. Since q k executes line B22, it received strictly more than n+t 2 VALUE'WITNESS (x, v) messages from different simulators. At least t + 1 correct simulators consequently sent this message to all processes at line B17 or at line B19. By Theorem 3, every correct simulator q j consequently eventually receives such a message from each correct simulator and assigns v to values j [x] .
Suppose that there exists a value v ′ = v such that there is a correct simulator q ℓ that assigns v ′ to values ℓ [x] . Suppose that q ℓ is the first process to do so. It follows that q ℓ received VALUE'WITNESS (x, v ′ ) messages from strictly more than n+t 2 different processes (line B21 or line B24). Consider the first correct simulator that broadcasts a VALUE'WITNESS (x, v ′ ) message. In order to do so, it must have received VALUE'VALID (x, v ′ ) messages from strictly more than n+t 2 different processes (lines B16-B17). However, the first correct simulator that broadcasts a VALUE'WITNESS (x, v) message must also have received VALUE'VALID (x, v) messages from strictly more than n+t 2 different processes. There must then be a correct simulator that sent both VALUE'VALID (x, −) messages. The only place a correct simulator can send a VALUE'VALID (x, −) message is at Line 15 and it does so only once for each simulator q x , a contradiction which concludes the proof of the lemma. Proof Let us recall that the algorithm implementing the operation decide() is described at lines C15-C19. Let q i and q j be two correct simulators. According to Lemmas 15-17, we have:
Let us assume, by contradiction, that q i and q j decide different values. This means that the sets min_σ i and min_σ j computed at line C17 by q i and q j , respectively, are different.
Since min_σ i and min_σ j are different, let us consider z ∈ min_σ i \ min_σ j (if min_σ i min_σ j , swap i and j). According to the closure predicate used at line C16, as z / ∈ min_σ j , we have ∀y ∈ min_σ j :
It follows that q j received VIEW'WITNESS (y, all_view j [y]) messages (with all_view j [y][z] = ⊥) from a set of simulators Q j,vw of size strictly larger than n+t 2 (the subscript vw stands for "view witness"). The correct simulators of Q j,vw sent these messages after checking at line B39 that a set Q j,vw,r of strictly more than n+t 2 reliably broadcast (thanks to the mechanism of lines B26 to B33) a READ'ANSWER (y, z, ⊥) message. The correct simulators of Q j,vw,r sent these messages at line B26 after they received VALUE'ACK (y, v y ) messages from a set Q y,w of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators (the subscript w stands for "witness"). Each correct simulator q k of Q y,w had values k [y] = v y when it sent this message and it happens strictly before the first correct simulator sends a READ'ANSWER (y, z, ⊥) message.
Since z ∈ min_σ i , the correct simulator q i received VIEW'WITNESS (z, all_view i [z]) messages from a set Q i,vw of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators. The correct simulators of Q i,vw sent these messages after the check of the values at lines B38-B39.
Suppose that some of them verified the predicate of line B39 for x = y. It entails that a set Q i,vw,r of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators reliably broadcast a READ'ANSWER (z, y, ⊥). The correct simulators of Q i,vw,r sent this message after receiving at line B24 VALUE'ACK (z, v z ) messages from a set Q z,w of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators. This happens strictly before the first READ'ANSWER (z, y, ⊥) message is sent by a correct simulator. Since |Q i,vw,r |, |Q j,vw,r | > According to the predicate of line C16, this entails that y ∈ min_σ i , and since the previous reasoning holds for any y ∈ min_σ j , it shows that min_σ j ⊆ min_σ i . It follows that, when q i executes line C17, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = ⊥ and, consequently, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = all_views j [y]. It entails that if |min_σ j | < |min_σ i |, then min_σ j would have been chosen by q i at line C17, which proves that min_σ i = min_σ j and contradicts the fact that q i and q j decide differently.
✷ In case (a), consider the first correct simulator q k that has broadcast a VALUE'WITNESS(j, −) message. In order to do so, it must have received VALUE'VALID(j, −) messages from more than 
Simulation algorithm and its proof in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]
Simulation algorithm When we consider the simulation algorithm described in Figure 2 , we observe that the n simulators communicate only through safe agreement objects. It follows that the same algorithm works in BAMP n,t [t < n/3], when the crash-tolerant safe agreement objects are replaced by Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects previously described. Two things remain to be done: define the specific sub-predicate P 2 of the predicate valid(), and do a specific proof of this algorithm (i.e., a proof based on the specification of the Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects defined in Section 5.2).
Sub-predicate P 2 As far as P 2 is concerned we have the following. Let us consider the simulator q i that invokes valid i (j, v), with respect to the simulation of a process p x . In the simulation algorithm, the parameter v is the message msg that q j proposes to a safe agreement object from which will be decided the next message to be received by the simulated process p x (lines 08-09 of Figure 2 ). P 2 checks, from q i 's local point of view, that, if the message v has been sent in the simulation, then it has not yet been consumed, i.e.,
Proof of the simulation algorithm in BAMP n,t [t < n/3] Lemma 20. The simulation of at most t simulated processes can be blocked.
Proof
The only places where a correct simulator q i can block is during the invocation of the safe agreement operation decide(). Such invocations appear at line 02, and line 11.
Because the invocations by all the correct simulators of decide() on all the safe agreement objects terminate, except for at most t safe agreement objects (Lemma 14), the simulation of at most t simulated processes can be blocked. Proof To prove the correctness of the simulation, we have to show that 1. Every message that was received by a simulated process was sent by another simulated process, 2. Every message that was sent by a simulated process to another simulated process (whose simulation is not blocked either), is received, and 3. The simulated messages respect a simulated physical order (i.e., no message is "received" before being "sent").
Item 1 follows from Lemma 19 and from the definition of P 2. Item 2 is satisfied because the messages sent by the simulated process p j to the simulated process p k are received (lines 09-11) in their sending order (as defined at line 04 and line 14). Hence, if p k is not blocked (due to a faulty simulator) it obtains the messages from p j in their sending order.
For Item 3, let us define a (simulated) physical order as follows. For each simulated message m, let us consider the first time at which the reception of m was simulated (i.e., this occurs when -for the first timea simulator terminates the invocation of SA[−, −].decide() that returns m). A message that is decided has been proposed by a simulator to a safe agreement object before being decided (validity property).The sending time of a simulated message is then the first time at which SA[−, −].propose(m) is invoked by a simulator. It follows that any simulated message is sent before being received, which concludes the lemma. ✷ Lemma 23 Lemma 24. Each correct simulator q i computes the decision value of at least (n ′ − t) simulated processes.
Proof Due to Lemma 20, and the fact that at most t simulators may be byzantine, it follows that at most t simulated processes may be prevented from progressing. As (a) by assumption the simulated algorithm A ′ is t-resilient, and (b) due to Lemma 23 the simulation produces a correct simulation of A ′ , it follows that at least (n ′ − t) simulated processes decide a value.
✷ Lemma 24 6 Beyond the BG Simulation BG-simulation in Byzantine message-passing systems A main result of this paper is a distributed algorithm that solves BG-simulation in Byzantine asynchronous message-passing systems. In addition to being the first algorithm that solves BG-simulation in such a severe failure context, the proposed simulation algorithm has noteworthy applications as shown below.
Beyond the BG-simulation: from Byzantine-failures to crash failures in message-passing systems The simulation presented here allows the execution of a t-resilient crash-tolerant algorithm in an asynchronous message-passing system where up to t processes may be Byzantine. A feature that is sometimes required from a Byzantine-tolerant algorithm solving a task (not usually considered in the crash failure case) is that the value decided by any correct process should be based only on inputs of correct processes. This prevents Byzantine processes from "polluting" the computation with their inputs. A way to guarantee that an input has been proposed by a correct process is to check that it has been proposed by at least (t + 1) different processes.
Assuming that in any execution at most m values are proposed, this constraint translates as n−t > mt [15, 28] . In the case of the simulation presented in Section 5, this requirement can easily be satisfied by adding a first step of computation before the start of the simulation. Simulators first broadcast their input. They then echo every value that they receive from more than t + 1 different simulators, and consider these values (and only these values) as valid inputs. An input considered valid by a correct simulator is then eventually considered valid by all correct simulators, and the only inputs allowed in the simulation are inputs of correct simulators. Because we consider colorless tasks, the choice of output is done in the same way as in the original BG-simulation: a simulator can adopt the output of any simulated process that has decided a value.
The possible Byzantine behaviors are restrained by the underlying Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects used in the simulation. Surprisingly, this shows that, from the point of view of the computability of colorless tasks and assuming n > (m + 1)t (this requirement always implies n > 3t when at least two different values can be proposed), Byzantine failures are equivalent to crash-failures. This provides us with a new understanding of Byzantine failures and shows that their impact can be restricted to the much simpler crash-failure case 3 .
Beyond the BG-simulation: from message-passing to wait-free shared memory The proposed simulation can be combined with previous works to further extend the scope of the result. Consider an algorithm A CASM,t,t+1 that solves a colorless task (with m > 1) and is designed to be executed in a wait-free read/write memory system of t + 1 processes. Using the basic BG-simulation [6] , this algorithm can be transformed into an algorithm A CASM,t,(m+1)t+1 that can be executed in a t-resilient read/write memory system of (m + 1)t + 1 processes, in which at most t can crash. Using an implementation of a read/write memory in a crash-prone message-passing system in which a majority of processes are correct [2] , we can obtain an algorithm A CAM P,t,(m+1)t+1 that can be executed in a message-passing system system of (m + 1)t + 1 processes, in which at most t can crash. Finally, using the simulation presented in this paper, we can obtain a Byzantine-tolerant algorithm A BAM P,t,(m+1)t+1 that can be executed in a message-passing system of (m + 1)t + 1 processes, of which at most t can be Byzantine.
The previous transformations show that, as far as the computability of colorless tasks that admit up to m > 1 different input values is concerned, a Byzantine-prone message-passing system of n processes, in which up to t < n/(m + 1) processes can be Byzantine, is equivalent to a wait-free shared memory system of t + 1 processes.
